The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, Swift v. Tyson, Uniform State Commercial Laws, and Federal Common Law: Ships That Passed in the Night? by Bittker, Boris I
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
DOCTRINE, SWIFT V. TYSON, UNIFORM 
STATE COMMERCIAL LAWS, AND 
FEDERAL COMMON LAW: SHIPS 
THAT PASSED IN THE NIGHT? 
Boris 1 Bittker * 
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall described the 
power of Congress to "regulate" commerce as "the power . . . to 
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed."I At first 
blush, this definition seems to contemplate that the legal principles 
governing the conduct of interstate commerce-e.g., whether nego-
tiations for the sale of goods to be shipped from one state to another 
have culminated in a binding agreement; what counts as a breach of 
such a contract; how a breach should be remedied; and the rights of 
third parties, like lenders, who participate in the transaction-are to 
be promulgated by Congress, not by the states. Federal sovereignty 
over the legal framework of interstate commerce seems not only to 
follow from Marshall's definitional remarks, but to be confirmed by 
an abundance of later judicial assertions: for example, that inter-
state commerce "comprehends all the component parts of commer-
cial intercourse between different states," including "every 
negotiation, contract, trade and dealing between citizens of different 
states" as well as "the obligation to pay and the right to recover the 
amount due. "2 
With equal frequency, however, we are told that there is no 
"federal general common law,"3 and every law student knows that 
• Copyright© Boris I. Bittker. All rights reserved. Sterling Professor of Law Emeri-
tus, Yale University. I am very grateful to Akhil Amar for helpful bibliographic suggestions. 
I. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 196 (1824). 
2. Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1931) (invalidating state law restricting 
right of foreign corporations to sue under contracts relating to interstate trade); see also 
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., !56 U.S. I, 13 (1895) ("(c]ontracts to buy, sell, or exchange 
goods to be transported among the several states ... may be regulated [by Congress] because 
they form part of interstate trade or commerce"); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 
257 U.S. 282, 290-91 (1921) ("where goods are purchased in one state for transportation to 
another the commerce includes the purchase quite as much as it does the transportation"), 
and cases there cited. 
3. E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 
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the principal statutes governing commercial transactions-the Uni-
form Commercial Code and its predecessors, such as the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Law and the Sales Act-were enacted by 
the states, not by Congress.4 If, however, we take account of the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (hereafter the DCCD}-that 
the states cannot regulate interstate commerce, even when Congress 
has not acted, if the subject requires "one uniform system, or plan 
of regulation"s-the law of interstate commercial transactions 
would seem condemned to drift without compass or rudder between 
state legislatures that can't regulate and a Congress that hasn't.6 
In fact, however, interstate business is not now, and has never 
been, required to navigate a trackless sea between Scylla and Cha-
rybdis. State statutes determine virtually all the legal rights and 
duties resulting from a commercial transaction,? a term described 
by the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code as follows: 
A single transaction may very well involve a contract for sale, followed by a 
sale, the giving of a check or draft for a part of the purchase price, and the accept-
ance of some form of security for the balance. 
The check or draft may be negotiated and will ultimately pass through one or 
more banks for collection. 
If the goods are shipped or stored the subject matter of the sale may be covered 
by a bill of lading or warehouse receipt or both. 
Or it may be that the entire transaction was made pursuant to a letter of credit 
either domestic or foreign. 
Obviously, every phase of commerce involved is but a part of one transaction, 
namely, the sale of and payment for goods.B 
Most of the documents mentioned in this inventory are so com-
pletely governed by state rules that a rigorous application of the 
DCCD to these rules would cause consternation if not panic in the 
commercial world. 
The only major exception to this virtual state monopoly of the 
U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), and cases there cited. For a corrective to this overinclusive general-
ization, see Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
881 (1986). For a classic analysis of Swift v. Tyson and of the Erie case, see Friendly, In 
Praise ofErie-<md of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964). 
4. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other partially self-governing political 
entities have also enacted many uniform commercial laws, but their action is comparable to 
the enactment of these statutes by the states, not to action by Congress for the entire nation. 
5. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); see generally L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-4 (2nd eel. )988). 
6. The state-federal antithesis is, of course, adapted from Judge Friendly's article, The 
Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 787 
(1963). 
7. State law is supplemented or superseded by the Federal Bills of Lading Act (infra 
note 9), the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, and a few more special-
ized federal laws and regulations, such as those governing bank collections. 
8. I U.C.C. at XVI (General Comment) (1989). 
1991] UNIFORM REGULATIONS 89 
commercial law governing interstate as well as intrastate transac-
tions is the Federal Bills of Lading Act of 1916.9 Although trade 
between buyers and sellers separated by long distances is virtually 
unimaginable without the ubiquitous bill of lading-a document so 
vital that if negotiable it must be transferred to effect delivery, a 
tender of the goods themselves being ineffective for this purpose to_ 
it was state law that gave bills of lading their force and effect before 
1916. State law controlled even though the Supreme Court had ob-
served as early as 1861, in A/my v. California, that "a bill of lading, 
or some written instrument of the same import, is necessarily al-
ways associated with every shipment of articles of commerce from 
the ports of one country to those of another ... [and is] hardly less 
necessary to the existence of such commerce than casks to cover 
tobacco or bagging to cover cotton."11 This statement presaged the 
9. See Federal Bills of Lading Act of 1916 (the "Pomerene Act") 49 U.S.C.A. § 81-
124 (West 1916); see also United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199 (1919) (act upheld as applied 
to counterfeit bills of lading). Reflecting the then-current meaning of "interstate commerce," 
the Act covers bills of lading issued by common carriers for the transportation of goods 
"from a place in one State to a place in another State, or from a place in one State to a place 
in the same State through another State or foreign country." For discussion of the Pomerene 
Act's substantive rules, which apply to both foreign and interstate commerce, see G. GIL-
MORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 93 (2d ed. 1975). The 1916 legislation did not 
wholly preempt the field; see Browne v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 267 U.S. 255 (1925) (state 
law governs existence of local custom regarding dates recited in bills of lading and scope of 
agent's authority to issue documents). 
An earlier but less comprehensive federal law governing bills of lading was the so-called 
Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 34 U.S.C. 595 (1906), which pro-
tected shippers by imposing on carriers issuing "through" bills of lading (i.e., covering ship-
ment over a series of connecting lines) liability for damage to the goods regardless of where 
the loss occurred, subject to reimbursement if the issuer could show that a later carrier was 
negligent. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913) (amendment adopted 
because state laws subjected railroads "to such a diversity of legislative and judicial holding[s] 
that it was practically impossible ... to know ... what would be the carrier's actual responsi-
bility as to goods delivered to it for transportation from one state to another"). 
10. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 9, at 90 ("the goods are locked up in the 
bill"). This legal principle creates practical difficulties that discourage the use of negotiable 
bills of lading for surface shipments, as contrasted with shipments by sea, as noted by G. 
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 1.4 (1965). See also Voghel v. 
N.Y., N.H., & H. R.R., 216 Mass. 165, 103 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1913) (consignee of shipment 
not entitled to delivery except on surrender of negotiable bill of lading). 
II. Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169, 174 (1860) (state tax on bills of lading 
covering shipment from San Francisco to New York held invalid under import-export clause 
of U.S. Constitution art. I, § 10, cl. 2). Eight years later, the Supreme Court held in Wood-
ruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868), that the import-export clause applied only to 
commerce with foreign countries; but instead of overruling Almy v. California, which in-
volved interstate commerce, the Court stated that A/my was "well decided" because the tax 
there invalidated conflicted "with the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the 
states." Jd. at 138. Read with this gloss, A/my can be described as the first case to use the 
DCCD to invalidate a state law, although that priority is ordinarily awarded to Case of the 
State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872). This may reflect doubts about the retroac-
tive rehabilitation of A/my; Cooley's treatise on taxation, which dominated this field for many 
years, states flatly that A/my "has been regarded as overruled" by Woodruff v. Parham, 
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Court's rationale for summarily upholding the power of Congress to 
enact the Federal Bills of Lading Act of 1916, viz., that "as instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, bills of lading are the efficient 
means of credit ... on which the commercial intercourse of the 
country, both domestic and foreign, largely depends."l2 
Though scarcely less crucial to the conduct of interstate trade 
than the rules governing bills of lading, the law of sales, negotiable 
instruments, and secured transactions not only was dominated 
throughout the nineteenth century by state law, but continues even 
to this day to rest largely on state rather than federal authority. To 
be sure, during most of the nineteenth century, the state rules were 
largely judge-made, and hence were in theory amenable to a degree 
of federalization under Swift v. Tyson; 13 but this process was con-
fined to cases satisfying the requirements for federal diversity juris-
diction, and it may not have applied to state commercial statutes, 
which were evidently more numerous than is ordinarily assumed. 14 
An example of such a 19th century statute is the New York Fac-
tors' Act, regulating the power of agents to pledge property con-
signed to them by distant owners, which was enacted in 1830 in 
response to an appeal from "sundry merchants and others of New 
York City," who complained that the rules of the pre-existing com-
mon law imposed unfair burdens on them in dealing with "a vast 
amount of property [that] was shipped to New York, from sister 
States and from foreign countries, in the names of factors selected 
by the owners." 1s 
Statutes like these, as well as state-to-state variations in the 
common law governing commercial transactions, led the American 
though he may have meant only that Woodruff rejected the import-export rationale for the 
decision. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OFT AXA TION 91 n.4, and 95-96 (2d ed. 
1886). 
For a case seemingly involving federal diversity jurisdiction that implicitly applies Swift 
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), in holding that a railroad bill of lading limiting the 
carrier's liability to an agreed amount did not violate public policy, see Hart v. Pennsylvania 
R. Co., 112 U.S. 331 (1884). 
12. United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199, 204 (1919). See also Atchison, Topeka, & S. 
Fe. Ry. Co. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371 (1916) (Carmack Amendment, supra note 9, precluded 
application of state law treating bills of lading as negotiable instruments), hinting but not 
deciding that the state law might violate the DCCD even in the absence of federal legislation. 
13. Supra note 3, see infra text at note 28. 
14. For references to nineteenth century state commercial law statutes, see Beutel, The 
Development of State Statutes on Negotiable Paper Prior to the NIL, 40 U. COLUM. L. REv. 
836 (1940); G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, supra note 10. 
For the application of Swift v. Tyson to state statutes "declaring" or "codifying" the preexist-
ing common law, see infra text at notes 53-56. 
15. 1830 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 179, 203. See F. BURDICK, THE LAWS OF SALES OF PER-
SONAL PROPERTY 276, 772 (2d ed. 1901) (tracing enactment and construction of this and 
similar statutes in other states). 
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Bar Association's Committee on Commercial Law to conclude, in 
1887, that "the present needs of the business community for uni-
formity of law relating to the enforcement of contracts and the col-
lection of debts imperatively demand national legislation as the only 
adequate means by which the desired relief and protection can be 
attained."I6 The Committee therefore recommended enactment of 
a federal bankruptcy act, a federal statute providing for a vendor's 
lien on property sold on credit in interstate commerce, and a federal 
negotiable instruments law governing promissory notes, bills of ex-
change, bank checks and other instruments "purporting to have 
been made in one of the United States, or a Territory thereof, or the 
District of Columbia, and payable in any other State, Territory, or 
country," which were declared to constitute the "means and instru-
ments of commerce among the several states."11 The Committee 
predicted that if Congress took the lead by enacting the laws relat-
ing to bills of exchange and other commercial paper used in inter-
state commerce, the states "would enact the same provisions for the 
regulation of commerce among their own citizens, and there would 
thus be provided a uniform system of law relating to the essential 
features of commercial transactions throughout the whole 
country."Is 
As authority for federal action, the ABA's 1887 Report cited 
half a dozen contemporaneous decisions upholding federal regula-
tions of interstate commerce,I9 and then asserted, in expansive 
terms suggesting that its members were premature New Dealers, 
that "it can scarcely be doubted [that] when merchants in one State 
buy goods from those in other States, thereby involving the trans-
portation of the goods from the seller to the purchaser, . . . the 
power of Congress extends to the passage of such laws as may be 
necessary to regulate these transactions in all their details, by pre-
scribing the rights and obligations of all parties concerned, and by 
16. 10 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 332, 352 (1887). Nine years earlier, when the ABA came 
into being, a committee on commercial law was instructed to inquire into the diversity of 
state rules governing negotiable or commercial paper and to offer suggestions "as to the pro-
priety and expediency of action on the part of the Association, looking toward greater uni-
formity in the law on that subject." I REP. OF THE A.B.A. 27 (1878). 
17. 10 REP. OF THE A.B.A. at 354 (draft bankruptcy act), 359 (draft vendor's lien) and 
362 (draft negotiable instruments law). The Committee's 1887 report was endorsed in princi-
ple by the A.B.A. itself in 1889; see 12 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 29, 35 and 343 (1889). 
18. 10 REP. OF THE A.B.A. at 79. A similar distinction between federal and state juris-
diction was implicit in an 1878 A.B.A. resolution requesting its committee on commercial 
law to report on the possibility of achieving uniformity in the law governing endorsements in 
blank of commercial paper by the enactment of state and federal legislation covering respec-
tively "domestic transactions" and "transactions between citizens of different states." 7 REP. 
OF THE A.B.A. at 74 (1884). 
19. 10 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 336-43. 
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prohibiting everything which in any way prevents or obstructs the 
essential features of all commercial transactions, the purchase or 
sale, delivery and payment. "2o 
Nothing, however, came of this call for a uniformity crusade to 
be led by Congress; indeed, it seems to have been abandoned before 
even the most optimistic lobbyist could have expected Congress to 
act. In 1890, after hearing still another appeal for uniformity in 
commerciallaw,21 the A.B.A. transferred the matter from its Com-
mittee on Commercial Law to a newly-created Committee on Uni-
form State Laws, which included A.B.A. members from every state 
in the union.22 A year later, this committee reaffirmed the A.B.A.'s 
commitment to uniformity in commerciallaw-"the vast volume of 
interstate trade and commerce and business dealings of all kinds, 
growing in range and complexity to enormous proportions, is enti-
tled to the protection and advantage of substantially uniform 
laws"-and reported that state commissions on uniform laws had 
been appointed by New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, New Jersey and Delaware and that other states were expected 
20. Id. at 343. See also Tucker, Congressional Power Over Inter-State Commerce, 11 
REP. OF THE A.B.A. 44, 247, 273 (1888) (commercial paper "between citizens of different 
states in payment of goods sold by one to the other" constitutes "interstate commercial inter-
course."). A confusing later comment by an influential member of the A.B.A. seems at first 
blush to reject any federal authority over notes generated by intrastate transactions that were 
transferred to out-of-state holders as a result of unexpected and unrelated later events, which 
would not have been subject to federal regulation under the draft 1887 bill cited supra note 
17. At any rate, in the end he argued for both federal and state legislation, the same position 
that was taken by the 1887 report itself. See 13 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 247, 262-63. 
Another discordant note on the subject of federal authority can be found in an 1891 
report of the A.B.A.'s Committee on Uniform State Laws, which addresses the contention 
that uniformity "can be better and more permanently secured ... by Congressional action, 
and, if necessary, by constitutional amendment ... than by separate state action." In re-
sponse, the report accepts as "conclusive" the counter-argument that Congress could not 
enact a uniform law of marriage and divorce "without absorbing eventually all the powers 
incidental to the subject, including family relations, property relations of husband and wife, 
guardianship of minors, custody and maintenance of children, legitimacy" and the rest of the 
law of domestic relations. "This [the Report asserts], it is evident the states will not permit. 
And the same difficulty lies in the path of national action in the other matters in question, 
except by constitutional amendments simply prohibitory in their nature" (emphasis added). 
See 14 REP. Of THE A.B.A. (1891), 365, 370, 373-74. The intended referent of the term "the 
other matters in question" is unclear, but if this report was intended to express qualms about 
the power of Congress to promulgate rules of commercial law for interstate transactions, it is 
hard to envision the source of the Committee's doubts or to understand why it would choose 
such a curiously vague way of repudiating the unqualified assertion of broad federal authority 
in 10 REP. OF THE A.B.A., see text at note 20. 
21. 13 REP. Of THE A.B.A. 247-63 (1890); see also id. at 11. With extraordinary presci-
ence, the speaker suggested that before the states could be persuaded to adopt uniform legis-
lation, the utopia predicted by Bellamy's Looking Backward might eliminate the need for 
uniformity since "bills of exchange and promissory notes would be superseded by credit 
cards." /d. at 263. 
22. The original mission of this committee was to seek uniformity in state laws gov-
erning wills, divorce, and acknowledgements. See 12 REP. Of THE A.B.A. at 96, 385 (1889). 
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to follow suif.23 It also exhibited a residue of hope for federal par-
ticipation by recommending the appointment of commissioners not 
only by the rest of the states, but also by Congress "for the territo-
ries and the District of Columbia. "24 
The result of these organizational activities was a meeting in 
1892 of delegates named by the state commissioners to a self-styled 
"Conference of the State Boards of Commissioners for Promoting 
Uniformity of Law in the United States," now known as the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on State Laws ("NCC").2s 
Although independent of the American Bar Association, its "gener-
ous godfather," the NCC met in its early years just before and in 
the same location as the A.B.A.'s annual meeting, thus becoming a 
training ground for aspiring A.B.A. leaders.26 
With pardonable grandiloquence, one of the NCC's early 
prime movers likened it to a forerunner to the Philadelphia Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787, the Annapolis Convention of 1786 be-
cause of the latter's mandate "to consider how far a uniform system 
in ... commercial intercourse [among the states] ... might be nec-
essary to their common interest and permanent harmony," while 
another, with equal plausibility, analogized the NCC to the Phila-
delphia Convention of 1787.27 The NCC might have claimed, more 
modestly but more persuasively, that it was heir to the nationalizing 
mission of Swift v. Tyson, in which Justice Story committed the 
Supreme Court to the principle that in diversity cases, "the true 
23. 14 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 365 (1891), reprinted in 9 National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Unifonn State Laws (hereafter "NCC") 1899 HANDBOOK, Appendix, at 20 (1899); 
see also 13 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 336 (1890) (text of New York law creating commission on 
legislative uniformity and inviting other states to send representatives to a convention to draft 
unifonn laws for submission to other states). 
24. /d. at 375. The NCC has included commissioners from the District of Columbia 
and other partially self-governing political entities (e.g., pre-statehood Hawaii and Alaska, 
the Philippine Islands, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico) and their legislative bodies have 
enacted some unifonn state laws. For an abortive later attempt to persuade Congress to 
create a national board of commissioners to promote unity "upon subjects wherein diversity 
is a hindrance to interstate commerce and an impediment to the prosperity of the country," 
including the preparation of codes of commercial and mercantile law for submission to Con-
gress or the states, see 4 NCC HANDBOOK 9-10 (1895). 
25. See 4 NCC HANDBOOK at 21. 
26. See 8 NCC HANDBOOK 13 (1899). ("generous godfather"); Toll, Uniform State 
Laws, 26 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 450 (1954) ("[C]onversations which the [NCC] commission-
ers had been carrying on among themselves during the preceding week had a great deal to do 
with the selection of the slate [of ABA officers and executive committee members] that was to 
be elected."); J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 290 
(1950). 
27. 12 NCC HANDBOOK 5-7 (1902); Stimson, UNIFORM STATE LEGISLATION, 9 NCC 
HANDBOOK 27, 36 (1899) ("first time that representatives of the States of the Union have 
been brought into common debate on questions of fundamental law since the meeting of the 
Constitutional convention itself"). 
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interpretation and effect [of contracts and other instruments of a 
commercial nature] are to be sought, not in the decisions of [state] 
tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial 
jurisprudence."2s To be sure, in this "great leap forward toward the 
goal of a nationally uniform law,"29 Justice Story's unifying instru-
ment was the federal judiciary, while the NCC looked to the legisla-
tures of the several states, a strategy that perhaps entitled the NCC 
to call itself Task Force E Pluribus Unum. As I read the record, 
however, the early exponents of uniform commercial laws did not 
draw any sustenance from Swift v. Tyson; indeed, rather than prais-
ing its vision of a national system of commercial law, they blamed 
the case for sowing confusion because the parties to a business 
transaction could not foresee whether a future dispute would be de-
cided by the state's decisional law or by the "general principles and 
doctrines of commercial jurisprudence" as construed in diversity 
cases by the federal courts.3o 
In its first two decades of life, the N CC drafted and endorsed a 
28. 41 U.S. I. For more on the relationship between this case and the uniform law 
movement, see infra text at notes 47-49. For an earlier precursor of the unified law move-
ment, see the remarks of James Sullivan, resuscitated from obscurity and summarized by I 
W. CROSSKEY, POLmCS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY Of THE UNITED 
STATES 36-37 (1953). 
29. G. GILMORE, THE AGES Of AMERICAN LAW 33 (1977). 
30. See, e.g., 13 REP. Of THE A.B.A. 247, 255-60 (1890). See also 304 U.S. 64 at 75 
("[I]n attempting to promote uniformity oflaw throughout the United States, the doctrine [of 
Swift v. Tyson] had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the state."). 
This complaint assumes that an otherwise dispositive decision by the state's highest court was 
frequently rejected by the federal judiciary, and that the state court subsequently adhered to 
its original decision; but my perusal of nineteenth century commercial law cases suggests that 
few of Swift v. Tyson's progeny fitted that classic pattern. More typical, at least in my re-
view, were cases in which the federal court described the state decision (if indeed any was 
cited) as ambiguous, distinguishable, or qualified by later decisions of the same state court, 
announced that it was in any event not bound by the state's decisions, and then turned for 
enlightenment to the "general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." (Since 
this is how many state courts would themselves fill in gaps in their decisional law, it might be 
said that the federal court, by looking to general commercial law, behaved as though it were 
"in etfect, only another court of the State"-its proper role in diversity cases, according to 
Justice Frankfurter's influential opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 
(1945).) If in such cases the federal court's reading of the state decisions was valid, then its 
decision did not by itself create a federal-state conflict, though a conflict would of course arise 
if the federal decision was later rejected by the state courts. If, on the other hand, the federal 
court was disingenuous in describing the state decisions, there may have been a present con-
flict, though an unacknowledged one. Unless disingenuousness was endemic among nine-
teenth century federal judges handling commercial litigation, however, clearcut but 
unacknowledged conflicts were not common. It is worth noting that Grant Gilmore persua-
sively accuses Justice Story of disingenuously elevating a few New York dicta to the status of 
an authoritative decision in Swift v. Tyson in order to assert that it conflicted with the "gen-
eral principles of commercial jurisprudence," when in fact New York law, properly con-
strued, already "coincided with that of the rest of the civilized world." G. GILMORE, supra 
note 29, at 32-33. See also Stalker v. M'Donald, 6 Hill 93 (NY 1843), disputing the validity 
of Justice Story's statement of New York law in Swift v. Tyson. 
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series of uniform commercial laws, encompassing negotiable instru-
ments (1896), sales (1906), warehouse receipts (1906), bills of lading 
(1909), and stock transfers (1898 and 1909), some of which were 
widely enacted.3I None of these state statutes, however, distin-
guished between intrastate and interstate commerce. Indeed, con-
fining their coverage to intrastate transactions would have 
trivialized the uniform commercial laws movement, as described in 
1911 by the NCC's president: 
[By the time] this Conference came into being, and quite irrespective of the 
merits or demerits of the proposed codification of the body of the law, public senti-
ment had gradually become aroused, to some extent at least, to an appreciation of 
the danger, uncertainty and gross injustice resulting from the different inferences 
drawn by the courts of the various states, from the precedents that were claimed to 
establish the law upon matters affecting the rights and duties of citizens whose busi-
ness was carried on beyond the borders of their own states. The close inter-commu-
nication brought about by the modern uses of steam and electricity have caused a 
revolution in mercantile business which has not yet reached its fullest development. 
Instead of going to the local shopkeeper for merchandise necessary for use in daily 
life, the distributing centers, even in obscure agricultural communities, have been 
transferred to great cities. The boundaries of the states have become, from the point 
of view of the business man, merely geographical expressions. 32 
It was these "geographical expressions," however, that gave 
the members of the NCC their mandate, which, according to the 
NCC itself, was "to examine [various subjects] upon which uni-
formity of legislation in the various states and territories of the 
union is desirable, but which are outside the jurisdiction of the Con-
gress of the United States" (emphasis added), with a view to drafting 
uniform laws to be submitted to the several states for approval and 
adoption.33 The commissioners must have been sorely tried by this 
restrictive enabling act; taken at face value, it unaccountably placed 
off limits any area that Congress had the constitutional power to 
31. For a summary of the NCC's early work on commercial law, see 18 NCC HAND-
BOOK at 101. The Federal Bills of Lading Act, supra note 9, was modelled on the NCC's 
Uniform Bills of Lading Act of 1909, modified to cover only interstate transactions. See 16 
NCC HANDBOOK 29 (1906) ("[W]e prepared an act to provide a negotiable bill of lading 
covering interstate shipments ... and that act was introduced in Congress."). 
32. Smith, President's Address, 21 NCC HANDBOOK, 95, 121 (1911) (quoting from an 
address of Frank Bergen, a fellow commissioner). The centrality of interstate transactions to 
the NCC's early activities is memorialized in a recent NCC LEAFLET titled A TRADITION OF 
ExcELLENCE as follows: "During their second decade, Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) 
concentrated on legislation that made interstate commerce easier." NCC LEAFLET, A TRA-
DITION OF EXCELLENCE 2 (1985). 
33. See the model act for the appointment of state commissioners, II NCC HANDBOOK 
6 (1901); the italicized restriction was omitted from the NCC's 1941 Model Act to Provide 
for the Appointment of Commissioners-9 U.L.A. 34 (1951Hut has not been wholly extir-
pated; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 6, § 27 (West 1985); Michigan, MICH. CoM-
PILED LAWS Ch. 8 (79-83) (West 1915). On the other hand, some states did not include the 
restriction even at the NCC's inception. See, e.g., N.Y. LAW Ch. 205 (1890). 
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regulate, even if the states had concurrent authority to act in the 
absence of federal preemption. In any event, the commissioners 
pursued their broad objective despite their narrow credentials; if 
challenged, perhaps they would have pled confession and avoidance 
and invoked the example of the delegates to the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787, who were sent to Philadelphia "for the sole and 
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation" but who, 
refusing to be shackled by their commissions, produced a new 
constitution. 34 
Whether the NCC's drafts, by covering interstate commercial 
transactions, were inconsistent with the authority vested in the 
commissioners by the states is now at most a footnote to history; 
whether the states, by enacting the model laws, asserted jurisdiction 
denied to them by the DCCD, is a more weighty issue, to which I 
now tum. 
Rooted in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the DCCD taught that 
the states could not regulate "subjects [that] are in their nature na-
tional, or admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation," 
even if Congress had not preempted the field.Js Committed as it 
was to the elimination of diversity, the NCC could hardly deny that 
commercial law was a "national" subject without concomitantly re-
pudiating its own raison d'etre; the accuracy of this label was fur-
ther confirmed by the virtually universal enactment of the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Law. The states thereby implicitly ac-
knowledged, in a paradox unique in the history of the DCCD, that 
the subject they were regulating was reserved by Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens for Congress because it required national uniformity, 
rather than the exercise of state-by-state "legislative discretion" to 
meet "local necessities."36 The NCC's call for uniformity stemmed 
34. For the resolution of Congress calling the convention ("for the sole and express 
purpose" etc.) and the credentials of delegates, see Ill M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 13, 559-86 (1986). 
35. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note 5. For a recent endorsement of Coo-
ley's "uniform national rule" formula, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 
(1978); see also Nat'! Agric. Chemicals Ass'n v. Rominger, 500 F. Supp. 465, 470 (E.D. Cal. 
1980); see generally Tribe, supra note 5. 
36. See Cooley, supra note 5, at 319 The states are, of course, not the arbiters of 
whether a uniform national rule is required; that role is vested in the federal judiciary, as 
noted in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). My point is that wide-
spread enactment of the uniform laws constituted an admission against interest, so to speak, 
that could have been taken into account by the federal couns in deciding whether uniformity 
in the treatment of interstate commercial transactions was necessary. 
A related paradox is that the NCC has had only minimal success in unifying the law in 
areas that create no DCCD obstacle to state action, such as marriage and probate procedure, 
perhaps because the hallmark of the state's constitutional freedom to act in these areas-the 
perceived virtue of taking account of local customs, preferences, and circumstances-leads 
state legislatures to view the NCC's unifying mission as quixotic or even counter-productive. 
1991] UNIFORM REGULATIONS 97 
from its recognition of the confusion resulting from conflicting state 
rules governing such matters as the holder-in-due-course status of 
transferees of negotiable instruments, the requisites of an effective 
transfer of merchandise in transit, and the validity of offbeat en-
dorsements of bank checks and bills of exchange-all threats to in-
terstate commerce of the type that the DCCD presumably 
prevented by outlawing state regulations even when Congress was 
silent. In the NCC's early years, the DCCD had already been used 
by the Supreme Court to invalidate a state's rules because another 
state might impose contradictory regulations on the same interstate 
transaction or event, thus making it impossible for the regulated 
enterprise to comply with the law of both states.37 Even resolving a 
contradiction by reference to conflict of laws principles only partly 
alleviates the potential burden on interstate commerce, since the 
parties to the transaction may be unable to predict with reasonable 
assurance the forum whose laws will ultimately be designated as 
controlling if a dispute actually arises. 
Thus the NCC labored in the penumbra, if not in the deep 
shade, cast by the DCCD, but if the Commissioners were worried 
about its emanations, their doubts left no mark on their uniform 
commercial laws, which were all equally applicable to interstate and 
intrastate transactions.3s Yet they could not have been unaware of 
the impact of the DCCD, which was "brought to fruition"39 during 
Justice Waite's tenure as Chief Justice (1874--1888). Indeed, of the 
Supreme Court decisions cited in the influential 1887 report of the 
A.B.A.'s Committee on Commercial Law, which helped to pave the 
way for the uniform laws movement, the five most recent cases as of 
the date of the report not only described the power of Congress as 
"exclusive," but also nullified state statutes infringing on this fed-
eral power even though Congress had not undertaken to employ 
it.40 
To be sure, the DCCD did not automatically condemn all state 
action merely because Congress could pre-empt the field; by the end 
37. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878). 
38. Although the Uniform Bills of Lading Act as proposed in 1909 did not exempt 
interstate transactions, a limitation necessarily resulted from the later enactment of the Fed· 
era! Bills of Lading act of 1916 (supra note 9), and was explicitly recognized by some states 
adopting the uniform act after 1916; see 4 U.L.A. § I (1985) (Statutory Notes). 
39. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND 
WAITE 74-75 (1937); see also D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, 31 (1990) (after the Civil War, the Commerce Clause 
"was wielded with increasing frequency to protect commerce against state interference"). 
40. 10 REP. OF THE A.B.A., supra note 16. See Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 
(1886); Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); Robbins v. Shelby 
County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Philadelphia & S. Mail A. S. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887); W. U. Telegraph Co. v. Pendelton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887). 
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of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court's criteria for applying 
the doctrine were so unclear, diverse, and inconsistent that "there 
were precedents to justify almost anything the Court might choose 
to decide. "41 In this lamentable state of the law, did the commis-
sioners wonder whether they were eliminating uncertainty in the 
law at the state legislative level, only to create uncertainty at the 
federal constitutional level? My perusal of the NCC annual hand-
books during its formative years failed to uncover any worries about 
the impact of the DCCD on the model commercial laws, and there 
is no mention of this subject in a forthcoming history of the NCC,42 
As events fell out, however, any misgivings that the commis-
sioners might have entertained proved to be groundless: the NCC's 
uniform laws were enacted as proposed, with no exemptions for in-
terstate transactions, and the federal courts not only interposed no 
constitutional objections, but were evidently never even called upon 
to examine the issue.43 Why not? Because no one complained, at 
41. Currie, supra note 39, at 31. For application of the DCCD when a transaction is 
subject to a state law that conflicts, or has the potential of conflicting, with the laws of an-
other state, see supra text at note 3 7. 
42. My search included all entries for "federal" and "commercial" in the 1945 consoli-
dated index to the NCC HANDBOOKS, as well as an examination of stenographic transcripts 
of the NCC's earliest proceedings and W. ARMSTRONG, A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
scheduled for publication in 1991, which its author graciously made available to me in manu-
script form. Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 237 (1965), asserts that the NCC manifested 
concern about the DCCD, citing a 1911 speech by its president as acknowledging that con-
gressional action was required to obtain uniformity in some aspects of the law governing 
incorporation, pure food and drugs, and warehouse receipts. 1911 NCC HANDBOOK 95. As 
I read the speech, however, it makes no mention of either incorporation or the DCCD, ex-
presses concern about state food and drug laws because Congress had already acted in that 
area, not because the states would be inhibited in the absence of federal action, and discusses 
the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, which followed the usual NCC practice of treating 
interstate and intrastate transactions alike, only in summarizing a decision involving a point 
of Pennsylvania law. 
43. In asserting this negative, I am conscious of trembling on the edge of an abyss, 
especially because I rejected the safety net proffered by Lexis and Westlaw and did my re-
search in the old fashioned way: by looking in books. For a pertinent decision by the New 
York Appellate Division, see Gubelman v. Panama Ry. Co., 192 A.D. 165, 182 N.Y.S. 430 
(1920) (Uniform Bills of Lading Act applies to interstate shipment from New York to Pan-
ama Canal Zone); for two inconclusive Massachusetts decisions, see Roland M. Baker Co. v. 
Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N.E. 1025 (1913), involving a dispute between two residents of 
Massachusetts over ownership of goods purchased in Russia and shipped to Boston, which 
rejected a claim that the Uniform Bills of Lading Act was an unconstitutional regulation of 
foreign commerce, since "[e]verything done by either party has been done [in Massachusetts], 
and it is only their rights against each other by reason of what has been done here that are 
now in question"; to the same effect, see Voghel v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., supra note 10 
("although this bill of lading was issued in a foreign country, [the Uniform Bills of Lading 
Act] is applicable to these parties as between themselves"). For cases upholding state laws 
governing the liability of interstate railroads to shippers in the absence of federal preemption, 
see Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra note 9. 
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least not with enough vigor and persistence to elicit a reported opin-
ion. Why not? I cannot offer a definitive answer, but here are some 
raw materials. 
First, when reading the Commerce Clause, nineteenth century 
lawyers probably associated the term "regulations" with legislative 
action, either by Congress or its counterparts in the several states. 
The common law, I suggest, would have been envisioned as the 
legal foundation for the conduct of commerce, rather than as a sys-
tem by which the government "regulated" the market by dictating 
or changing the terms of private bargains.44 To be sure, political 
scientists might regard this dichotomy as a distinction without a 
difference, and one can conjure up classroom examples that it might 
not survive even in the minds of lawyers. Assume, for example, 
that an agrarian state elected a populist judge-call him Cardozo of 
the Prairies-on a pledge to modernize the common law by cram-
ming its interstices full of long-overdue social reforms, and that his 
first decision required all railroad trains to make unscheduled stops 
to pick up would-be passengers whenever hailed by a flag or lantern, 
because in serving the public from whom they derive their privi-
leges, they must always be animated by "the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive. "4s Even an intellectually phlegmatic nineteenth 
century lawyer might well have concluded that this provocative ver-
sion of the common law was as much a "regulation" of interstate 
commerce as a state statute of similar import;46 but this hypothesis, 
based on an extreme case, does not undermine my more general 
supposition that conventional judge-made law was probably viewed 
as immune to the DCCD's constitutional standards. 
44. For an opinion that flirts with this idea, see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ. 
Co., 181 U.S. 92 (1901), rejecting plaintiff's claim that the state common law requiring com-
mon carriers to justify rate discrimination among customers was an unconstitutional regula-
tion of interstate commerce; blurring the issue, the Court found that the "general common 
law existing throughout the United States" forbade rate discrimination by common carriers. 
See also Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477 (1903), in which state common law, 
invalidating contracts by common carriers to limit their liability to shippers, was attacked 
(though unsuccessfully) as improperly interfering with interstate commerce; Atchison, To-
peka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371 (1916), treating as an open question, not 
needing to be decided, the claim that the rule governing the rights of a holder in due course of 
a bill of lading concerning an interstate shipment, as determined by the common law of Kan-
sas, "constituted a direct burden on interstate commerce, and was therefore void"; Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133 (1898) (state statute forbidding com-
mon carriers to reduce by contract their common law liability to passengers upheld as applied 
to interstate trip). 
45. The standard owed by common carriers to the public was, of course, derived by our 
imaginary populist judge from Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 NY 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) 
(Cardozo, J.). 
46. See Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Ill., 177 U.S. 514 (1900) (state law requiring all trains to 
stop at all county seats held invalid; no evidence that suitable alternative accommodations 
were not available). 
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A belief that the DCCD was not applicable to a state's com-
mercial common law-assuming that the issue rose to the level of 
conscious attention--could also have been fostered or buttressed by 
the sub silentio acceptance in Swift v. Tyson of the assumption that, 
were it not for the accident of diversity jurisdiction, the legal status 
of a bill of exchange executed in Maine and accepted by the defend-
ant in New York would be determined by New York law despite 
the instrument's interstate attributes.47 To be sure, the DCCD was 
only an embryo when Swift v. Tyson was decided (1842),48 but its 
later growth as a threat to state legislative action could well have left 
unimpaired the impression, suggested by Swift v. Tyson, that the 
common law was immune to attack on DCCD grounds. Moreover, 
when state courts refused to bring their decisions into line with the 
"general commercial law" as expounded by Swift v. Tyson and its 
progeny, businessmen and their lawyers complained that the fed-
eral/state divergence was an inconvenience or nuisance, but not 
that the state rule was an unconstitutional "regulation" of interstate 
commerce by the state courts. 49 
Second, assuming that I am right in postulating that the com-
mon law was implicitly immunized against the DCCD, I suggest 
that tum-of-the-century lawyers may have assumed, again impli-
citly rather than overtly, that the same shield protected the NCC's 
early uniform state laws, like the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Law and the Uniform Sales Act, when applied to interstate transac-
tions. Commenting on the reception of these uniform state com-
mercial laws, Grant Gilmore observed 
[T]hey were hardly treated as statutes. The general understanding of the pro-
fession seems to have been that the new statutes were designed merely to restate the 
common law. The lawyers and judges, who were entirely familiar with the common 
law, went on thinking, talking, arguing and deciding cases, as if the statutes had 
never been passed. In time, the common law background faded from consciousness 
and the statutes had to be seriously examined-but that took a generation or 
more. 50 
47. 41 U.S. I. The bill of exchange in Swift v. Tyson was drawn by a resident of Maine 
in favor of one Norton, evidently also a resident of Maine, and was accepted by the defend-
ant, a resident of New York, in part payment for lands located in Maine, which he had 
contracted to purchase from Norton and a person associated with him. The residence of 
Swift, to whom Norton negotiated the bill, is not stated in the opinion, but he took the bill in 
connection with a transaction with a Maine bank. 
48. Cooley v. Board of Wardens 53 U.S. 299, is usually cited as the first explicit recog-
nition of the DCCD, but it did not spring full-blown from the pen of Justice Curtis, who 
wrote for the majority in that case; for precursors, see Justice Johnson's concurring opinion 
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824), and Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh 
Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), where Chief Justice Marshall referred to "the power [of 
Congress] to regulate commerce in its dormant state." 
49. See, 13 Rep. of the A.B.A. supra note 30. 
50. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1044 (1961); see 
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Thus, until the profession began to distinguish clearly between 
the commercial common law and the NCC's uniform state statutes, 
one might well expect that lawyers would attribute to the latter, by 
unarticulated assumption if not explicitly, the same constitutional 
status they accorded to the former. 
Third, even an imaginative lawyer, unhampered by the blind-
ers of custom, would hesitate to invoke the DCCD to attack a 
troublesome provision of a uniform commercial statute unless the 
alternative common rule that would be substituted for the statutory 
provision would be more attractive. Only an incorrigible optimist, 
however, could be confident of this result. Whether the statutory 
provision was replaced by the state's pre-existing decisional law (or 
by a hypothesized decision if the issue had not been previously de-
cided by the state courts), as one might infer from Swift v. Tyson, 51 
or by "the general common law existing throughout the United 
States," as might be inferred from a later Supreme Court decision,s2 
the substitute was likely in the overwhelming bulk of cases to be the 
same as the statutory provision that the litigant was hoping to es-
cape. After all, the uniform law movement sought to tidy up the 
nation's commercial law-to "declare" or "codify" rather than to 
reform or revolutionize it-and the objectionable divergences that 
were eliminated to achieve uniformity were mostly warts on an 
otherwise acceptable portrait. 
This melancholy thought-that a lawyer's trailblazing use of 
the DCCD to attack a troublesome provision of a state's uniform 
commercial law might merely give his client an expensive 360 de-
gree trip through a revolving door-suggests an equally melancholy 
conjecture: that the NCC's much vaunted uniform commercial 
laws made so few substantive changes in the preexisting common 
law that litigants were not motivated to question their constitu-
tional validity as applied to interstate commercial transactions be-
cause a successful attack would ordinarily merely substitute 
Tweedledee for Tweedledum. 
Fourth, for lawyers seeking to avoid a menacing statutory pro-
vision, there was sometimes an alternative to the untested DCCD 
route if the client could satisfy the requirements of federal diversity 
also Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 396 (1908), decrying 
judicial hostility to "statutory intruders" into areas traditionally covered by the common law. 
51. Supra note 3. The suggestion in the text assumes that the venue for the hypotheti-
cal litigation was a state coun. Diversity cases in the federal couns would probably have 
been governed either by the state's common law or by the "general" common law, depending 
on the impact of Swift v. Tyson on declaratory state statutes; for this issue, see infra text at 
notes 53-56. 
52. 181 u.s. 92. 
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jurisdiction: Swift v. Tyson.s3 Distinguishing in that case between a 
state's common law and its "positive statutes ... and the construc-
tion thereof adopted by the local tribunals," the Supreme Court 
held that the federal courts, when exercising their diversity jurisdic-
tion, were not bound by the former, and this principle led some 
ingenious lawyers to argue that statutes "declaring" or "codifying" 
the common law should be given the same treatment as common 
law rules rather than accorded the status of "positive statutes." 
This claim was accepted by some lower federal courts and was not 
rejected by the Supreme Court until1934,s4 only four years before it 
overruled Swift v. Tyson itself.ss From 1897, when Connecticut be-
came the first state to enact the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Law, to 1934, a few assiduous litigants appealed successfully from 
various provisions of state commercial statutes to the "general com-
mercial law" as expounded and applied by the federal courts in di-
versity cases under Swift v. Tyson .s6 This pre-1934 alternative to 
the DCCD, however, was not available to litigants in those federal 
courts that, anticipating the Supreme Court's 1934 decision, refused 
to assimilate declaratory statutes to the common law, nor could it 
be invoked by litigants who did not qualify for federal diversity 
jurisdiction. 
Finally, in trying to account for the charmed life enjoyed by 
the uniform state laws, we must remember that not every intriguing 
legal issue is litigated, a fact of life that would be deplorable save for 
its admirable redeeming social consequence, viz., enabling law 
professors to flog the same horse in the classroom year after year. 
53. 41 u.s. I. 
54. Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487 (1934) (under§ 34 of Judiciary Act of 
1789, applicable state statute furnishes rules of decision for federal courts; interpretation by 
highest state court is as conclusive as though "literally incorporated" into the statute), revers-
ing Bums Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 67 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1933) (federal courts not bound by 
state court interpretation of"state statute such as the [Uniform] Negotiable Instruments Law 
which attempts to codify the rules that govern a branch of general commercial law"). For 
earlier decisions applying Swift v. Tyson to state decisions interpreting "declaratory" stat-
utes, see Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 290 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. Okla. 1923) ("when the 
statute of a state is merely declaratory of the general principles of the common law, a federal 
court sitting in that state is not bound by the construction of such statute where a question of 
general commercial law is involved"; principle applied to Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Law); see also the more tentative comments by Judge Learned Hand on this issue in Ameri-
can Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Board, 7 F.2d 565, 566 (1925) ("the rule of compul-
sory conformity [under§ 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789] perhaps does not apply to a statute 
codifying a part of the commercial law, as to which we in general follow our own notions"); 
Babbitt v. Read, 236 F. 42,49 (2d Cir. 1916) (doctrine of independence "not so well settled"); 
for other cases, both pro and con, see Bums Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 67 F.2d at 495; see also 
Beutel, Common Law Judicial Techniques and the Law of Negotiable Instruments-Two Un-
fortunate Decisions, 9 TUL. L. REv. 64, 67 (1934). 
55. 304 u.s. 64. 
56. For these courts, see Bums Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 67 F.2d at 495, n.l2. 
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For a lawsuit, one ordinarily needs "an adventitious concatenation 
of the determined party, the right set offacts, the persuasive lawyer, 
and the perceptive court."s1 I say "ordinarily," because quite a lot 
of law is made by unpersuasive lawyers grasping at straws; they also 
serve who only leap and lose. But even if all lawyers-good, bad, 
and indifferent-were brigaded together, they would still not be 
able to litigate everything. 
On analysis, therefore, the paucity of DCCD attacks on the 
uniform state commercial laws is not as astonishing as it originally 
seemed; but even if it is not as baffling as a riddle wrapped in a 
mystery inside an enigma, it remains, I fear, a conundrum. 
• • • • 
In 1937-half a century after the American Bar Association's 
Committee on Commercial Law proposed enactment of a federal 
negotiable instruments law and other legislation governing inter-
state commercial transactionsss_a successor A.B.A. committee 
recommended enactment of a federal sales act.s9 The 1937 propo-
sal, like its 1887 precursor, died aborning, but the fact that it was 
conceived testifies to the obstacles blocking the achievement of a 
nationalized commercial law via the uniform state laws movement: 
the time, cost, and energy required to campaign for each model act 
in every state; the pressure to sacrifice uniformity by accepting local 
amendments in order to win enactment;60 the danger that post-
adoption amendments, however desirable, will not be universally 
accepted, shattering whatever uniformity had been attained;6I the 
painful fact that every state's courts have the last word in constru-
ing every provision, no matter how it is interpreted in other states 
57. Friendly, supra note 6, at 791. 
58. Supra note 17. 
59. 62 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 610 (1937); see generally, A Symposium: The Proposed 
Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 537 (1940); W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE 
REALIST MOVEMENT 276 (1973). There were two 1937 bills (H.R. 1619 and H.R. 7824, 
75th Cong., 1st sess.); both died in committee, as did a 1940 successor, H.R. 8176, 76th 
Cong., 3d sess. The coverage of these proposals was limited to transactions in interstate 
commerce; see Note, Federal Sales Act: Constitutional Comment, 26 VA. L. REV. 688 (1940); 
W. Crosskey, supra note 28, at 38. The NCC's Revised Uniform Sales Act was the residuary 
legatee of the unsuccessful federal sales act project; see W. TwiNING, supra at 278-80. 
60. See generally, Schnader, Why the Commercial Code Should Be "Uniform", 20 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (1963). 
61. For early recognition that the Negotiable Instruments Law, though "the most con-
summate piece of codification in the legal literature of our language ... cannot be implicitly 
relied on as a uniform law, even (where] it has been enacted" because it had already been 
subjected to piecemeal amendments by some states, see 21 NCC HANDBOOK (1911), 121. 
Two years earlier, the president of the National Conference had suggested that the interstate 
compact provision of the Constitution (art. I, § 10) might be employed to ensure that no 
state, after adopting a uniform law, could amend it without the approval of the Conference[!] 
and then only if all other states adopted the same amendment. Eaton, Attitude of the Bench 
and Bar Towards the Negotiable Instruments Law, 19 NCC HANDBOOK, 55, 60. 
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and despite the admonition, included in some acts, that the law is to 
be construed and applied to promote uniformity across state lines;62 
and the risk in each state that subsequent legislation will effect de-
stabilizing repeals or amendments by implication. 63 
Within weeks after losing this battle for a federal sales act, the 
partisans of uniformity started to plan what became "one of the 
most ambitious legislative ventures of modem times, "64 the Uni-
form Commercial Code, a joint project of the American Law Insti-
tute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws. Like its superseded predecessors, such as the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform Sales Act, the UCC 
applies without distinction to interstate and intrastate transactions; 
and also like them, its widespread adoption by the states mutely 
cries out that commercial law is a "national subject" that, in the 
words of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, requires "one uniform system 
or plan of regulation. "6s 
Indeed, if this truism requires explicit support, it can be found 
in the UCC's almost forgotten Proposed Final Draft, issued in 1950, 
which consisted of a "State Version" to be enacted by the states, 
and a "Federal Version" to be enacted by Congress, the latter en-
compassing any contract that "is in or affects interstate com-
merce."66 The justification for the Federal Version was explained 
as follows: 
Hitherto the field of law covered by this statute has been almost entirely state 
law. 
Today the number of commercial transactions which pass between the states or 
62. See, e.g., Uniform Sales Act, § 74. See generally Hintze, Disparate Judicial Con· 
struction of the Uniform Commercial Code- The Need for Federal Legislation, 1969 UTAH L. 
REv. 722. The U.C.C. now has the benefit of a permanent editorial board, empowered to file 
amicus briefs on U.C.C. issues on request by state courts. See Dezendorf, How the Codes 
Permanent Editorial Board Is Functioning, 22 Bus. LAw. 227 (1966); 1 U.L.A. xxix-xl 
(1989). 
63. For an effort to protect against implied repeals, see U.C.C. § 1-104 (1989) (no 
implied repeal by later legislation "if such construction can reasonably be avoided"). 
64. Twining, supra note 59, at 270. 
65. Cooley, supra note 5. 
66. ALI and NCC, Uniform Commercial Code: Proposed Final Draft (Spring 1950), 
§ 1-105. The Federal Version also reached contracts involving any "federal territory," de-
fined to mean the District of Columbia and any United States territory or possession without 
its own legislative body. 
In a discussion of the Federal Version, Professor Braucher asserted: 
The constitutional power of Congress to act on commercial law in interstate trans-
actions is clear; it deserves no further discussion. (Braucher, Federal Enactment of 
the Unzform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 102 (1951).) 
Those who are not satisfied with this assurance can consult other sources, e.g., Hintze, Dispa-
rate Judicial Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code- The Need for Federal Legisla-
tion, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 722; Johnson, Constitutional Law-A Federal Commercial Code-
Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 45 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1947). 
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which directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce has become so great as to 
warrant the Congress of the United States in entering the field by enacting this Code 
to apply wherever the contract or transaction falls within the permissible jurisdic-
tion of Congress under the commerce clause as that jurisdiction has been defined in 
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States construing the words 
"affects interstate commerce:•67 
105 
As routinely applied when the UCC was being drafted, the 
term "affects interstate commerce" was so expansive6s that the Fed-
eral Version would have left nothing but a few crumbs to the State 
Version-an outcome that, one would have supposed, would have 
been welcomed by the unifiers because in one fell swoop it would 
have nationalized commercial law for the overwhelming bulk of 
business transactions. 
In the principal scholarly commentary on the Federal Version, 
a leading proponent of the UCC's reforms warned that "[i]f the 
Code is to become law anywhere without causing more trouble than 
it cures, the Federal Version must be enacted before or soon after 
the first state acts. "69 He explained his caveat as follows: 
The proposed Code is no mere list of specific amendments to cure ambiguities 
and conflicts of authority; it is a sweeping revision and reform in the light of fifty 
years of experience under the uniform Jaws. It seems likely that state legislatures 
will be no Jess hesitant to pass it than they were to pass comparatively minor 
amendments. In the absence of Congressional action, then, one could anticipate a 
fifty-year interval during which various common-law rules would prevail in some 
states, several versions of some or all of the uniform acts would prevail in others, 
and the Code, with or without amendments, would be in force in still others. The 
principal benefit would be the creation of a vast experimental laboratory for the 
conflict of Jaws. 70 
Enactment by Congress of the Federal Version would also, he 
noted, immunize the law governing interstate transactions-the 
principal object of the UCC's solicitude-against the virus of non-
uniform amendments and conflicting state interpretations. As for 
67. U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft at 14 (May 1949). 
68. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill (1942). 
69. Braucher, supra note 66, at 104. Braucher proposed to reduce the Federal Version's 
jurisdictional reach by relegating to the states any contract whose "points of contact [i.e., 
offer, acceptance, performance, etc.] are limited to a single state or Territory.'' /d. at 107. He 
objected to broader federal authority for prudential reasons, primarily fear that state legisla-
tures would resent it and that Congress might refuse to enact it. For Judge Friendly's bolder 
vision of federal action, see infra note 75. 
In later pedagogical works, Braucher did not mention his 1951 warning against state 
enactment of the UCC without a federal counterpart, though it would surely have been good 
for a few minutes of classroom debate. SeeR. BRAUCHER, CoMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS; 
TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS (2d eel. 1958); R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION 
TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1977). Braucher's Legislative History of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958), also omits any mention of the Federal 
Version in discussing the U.C.C.'s preenactment history. 
70. Braucher, supra note 66, at 104. 
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the uniformity that would be achieved for intrastate transactions by 
concurrent state enactment of the State Version, he regarded that as 
merely a useful by-product, since "our nationwide corporate enter-
prises . . . have learned to operate without [this type of 
uniformity]."7I 
Despite this focus on the needs of interstate merchants and 
their lawyers, partisans of the Federal Version evidently did not 
play the DCCD card by arguing that a commercial code deriving its 
authority solely from the states could not constitutionally regulate 
interstate transactions. In any event, before Professor Braucher's 
ardent espousal of the Federal Version reached its audience, the 
dual-version strategy had already been abandoned by the UCC's 
Editorial Board. Its Proposed Final Draft No. 2, issued in the 
spring of 1951, carried forward only the State Version, under which 
the UCC applies to any contract with any of a number of specified 
relationships to the enacting state (e.g., offer, acceptance, perform-
ance, delivery of goods, issue or receipt of a bill of lading or other 
document of title, application for or extension of credit, etc.). n 
This abandonment of the Federal Version was not only complete 
but also ignominious: it was not labelled "AAA-Major change of 
substance," nor even "AA-Minor change of substance," but only 
"A-change of form only." An additional ignominy was added by a 
contemporaneous account of changes in the UCC drafts, which 
does not even mention the demise of the Federal Version.73 
Thereafter, a survivor from the first two decades of the NCC 
would have had a sense of deja vu: like the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Law, the first success of the uniform laws movement, 
the UCC was enacted by every state without any exemptions for 
interstate transactions, while the DCCD slept on, totally ignored by 
the UCC's draftsmen, by practitioners and academicians comment-
ing on the UCC before and after its enactment, by lawyers repre-
senting clients with UCC disputes, and by judges interpreting the 
UCC. If awakened, however, the DCCD has a last clear chance to 
71. Braucher, supra note 66, at 104. 
72. U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft No. 2, § 1-105(2) (Spring 1951). No distinction is 
made between interstate and intrastate transactions, but if the contract bears "a reasonable 
relationship" to two or more states-as is ordinarily if not invariably true of interstate trans-
actions-the parties may agree on which jurisdiction's law shall apply. /d., Section 1-105( 6). 
See generally, Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements--New York's Ap-
proach, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323 (1979), and articles cited there at n.3. 
73. See Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, A Report on Developments/rom May 
1950 through February 1951, 6 Bus. LAW. 113 (1951). For a threat to revive the Federal 
Version, issued when some states, all of which eventually fell into line, were being recalci-
trant, see Schnader, The Uniform Commercial Code-Today and Tomorrow, 22 Bus. LAW. 
229, 232 (1966). 
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collide with the UCC; and if it were held that the UCC is an uncon-
stitutional regulation of interstate commerce, Congress might be 
impelled, a century after the exponents of uniformity first looked to 
Washington for salvation, to enact a federal code of commercial 
law, 74 possibly even one applicable to intrastate as well as interstate 
transactions.7s For this author, a harmless drudge poking through 
the dustbin of history, that would be pay dirt indeed. 
74. Federal enactment of the U.C.C. would produce a corpus of what Judge Friendly 
called "specialized federal common law," i.e., "a federal decisional law ... that is truly 
uniform because, under the supremacy clause, it is binding in every forum," unlike the 
"spurious uniformity" achieved by Swift v. Tyson, which prevailed only in diversity cases. 
Friendly, supra note 3, at 405. 
75. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 419, "[S]hould Congress take the still bolder step of 
declaring that, in order to make (federal enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code) truly 
workable in these large areas of its enumerated powers [i.e., interstate transactions, bank-
ruptcy, admiralty, etc.), the small remaining enclaves [i.e., intrastate commerce] must also be 
occupied?" 
